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THE PORTUGUESE ESCUDO IN THE ERM AND THE EFFECTIVENESS




The empirical assessment of the effectiveness of
exchange rate management has been addressed in
the literature. Most papers have studied whether
the central banks have achieved smoothness of ex-
change rates through the use of their two main in-
struments: interventions in the currency market
and the overnight interest rate in the money mar-
ket. The theoretical support for the empirical anal-
ysis is consistently absent. That is not surprising as
the theoretical analysis of the optimal exchange
rate policy is unable to answer questions like
when and how to defend from a speculative at-
tack, and incapable of disentangling autonomous
policy action from policy response to market be-
haviour.
In the current paper, we perform a case study
of the Portuguese exchange rate management in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) period,
April 1992 – December 1998. This approach, com-
plementary to existing econometric work, allows a
more detailed tracking of the degree of exchange
rate pressure and of the instruments used to deal
with it. We discuss the behaviour of the Portu-
guese Escudo (PTE) exchange rate (against the
German Mark (DEM)) and the use of instruments
by the Banco de Portugal, namely interventions in
the foreign exchange market and official interest
rates. Our analysis of effectiveness adopts the
view that massive sales of foreign reserves, or
steep interest rate increases, or both, coupled with
observed exchange rate smoothness, meaning ab-
sence of large depreciation, should be classified as
speculative attacks defended with success. The re-
sults suggest that most of the time, even during
the ERM crisis, the Banco de Portugal policy was
successful. Over the whole period, from April 1992
until December 1998, the central bank did take ac-
tion in a small percentage of days, most of the time
with success. The percentage of days in which the
Banco de Portugal did not take action and never-
theless the exchange rate was smooth was above
98 per cent. The vast majority of the days in which
the Banco de Portugal decided not to take action
and the exchange rate was not smooth corre-
sponded to days located around four episodes, the
three realignments of the PTE and the widening of
the ERM bands in August 1993. In all these epi-
sodes the Portuguese Authorities did not take the
initiative of asking for the realignment or for the
widening of the band.
The rest of the paper is organized in the follow-
ing way: section 2 describes the historical context;
the PTE experience is laid out in section 3 and sec-
tion 4 discusses the effectiveness of the exchange
rate management by the Banco de Portugal; sec-
tion 5 provides concluding remarks; an appendix
briefly discusses the mechanics of a speculative at-
tack.
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 2003 45
Articles
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.
We thank to Maximiano Pinheiro, Ana Cristina Leal, José
Ferreira Machado, Carlos Robalo Marques and Delfim Neto for
suggestions. We are especially grateful to Marta Abreu for the
detailed comments and corrections to an earlier version. We
also wish to thank Ana Paula Marques and Antonio Gonçalves
from the Markets and Reserve Management Department for in-
sightful conversations. The usual disclaimer applies.2. SOME HISTORICAL FACTS ABOUT THE EMS
The European Monetary System (EMS) was cre-
ated in March of 1979. It was an arrangement es-
tablished among the members of the 9 European
Community countries with the aim of limiting the
exchange rate fluctuations of the following curren-
cies: DEM, French Franc (FRF), Dutch Guilder
(NLG), Belgian Franc (BEF), Danish Krone (DKK),
Irish Pound (IEP) and Italian Lira (ITL). The mech-
anism in which the currencies were linked was re-
ferred to as the ERM. The Luxembourg currency,
Luxembourg Franc (LUF), matched the Belgium
currency, BEF, since they were already in a cur-
rency union. The British Pound (GBP) at the begin-
ning was not in the ERM. All ERM currencies had
a symmetric band of fluctuation of 2.25 per cent
around the central parity, except for the ITL, which
had a band of 6 per cent (narrowed to 2.25 per cent
in January 1990). Until 1992 three other currencies
joined the ERM: the Spanish Peseta (ESP) in June
of 1989, the GBP in October 1990, and the PTE in
April 1992, all adopting the 6 per cent band. In
September 1992, the ITL and the GBP left the ERM
(the ITL would rejoin in November 1996). The cur-
rencies of two newcomers to the European Union
the Austrian Schilling (ATS) and the Finnish
Markka (FIM) joined in January 1996 and October
1996, respectively. The last country to join the ERM
was Greek Dracma Greece in March 1998.
The responsibility for maintaining each bilat-
eral exchange rate within the band was formally
shared by both countries. Interventions were man-
datory on both countries whose currencies hit the
respective fluctuation margins. In practice this
meant that the strong currency country had to sell
its currency and the weak currency country had to
buy its currency. Interventions could be carried
out in any currency: for example the central bank
of the strong currency country could be selling its
currency against United States Dollar (USD), DEM
(if that central bank was not the Bundesbank), etc.
Arrangements for providing credit to weak cur-
rency central banks were set. There was a
short-term automatic financing facility that pro-
vided unlimited credit for 45 days for marginal in-
tervention(1). A central bank could not stop inter-
vening if its parity vis-à-vis another member cur-
rency was pressed against one of its limits(2). Other
ERM countries could provide help by also inter-
vening in the foreign exchange markets. In special
circumstances, i.e. if exchange rates became mis-
aligned, the central rates could be revised with the
consent of all concerned. The Single Market Pro-
gram, which required the removal of capital con-
trols, was implemented since the mid 1980s. Thus,
during a certain period in some of the ERM coun-
tries there were capital controls that were used to
help maintaining the exchange rate inside the
band. Since 1990 capital movements including
short-term capital and monetary instruments were
free(3).
Not only the parity levels within the ERM were
adjusted occasionally (see Table 1) but also the
width of the bands adopted changed, in 2 August
1993. During the period between 1979 and 1987,
realignments were frequent; the central parities
changed 11 times. The last realignment in 1987 led
to revisions of the EMS arrangements in the
Basle-Nyborg agreement of 12 September 1987.
The agreement extended the credit facilities to lon-
ger periods, and gave weak currency countries up
to 75 days of unlimited access to credit from stron-
ger ERM currencies. For the first time it was per-
mitted to draw on credits before a currency
reached the limit of its ERM band. Except for Italy,
there were no adjustments in the central parity be-
tween 1987 and mid-September of 1992. Bands at
2.25 per cent were maintained for those countries
that adopted them initially, and the band of fluctu-
ation for the ITL was narrowed to 2.25 per cent in
8 January 1990.
European currency problems of the 1990’s were
more profound than all the previous ones. In the
literature the period September 1992 – July 1993 is
identified with a currency crisis period for the
ERM. The ITL and GBP floated. The IEP was de-
valued once, the PTE twice, and the ESP three
times. Finally, on the 2nd of August of 1993 it was
decided to widen the bands to [-15,+15] per cent(4).
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(1) Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996) refer that the Bundesbank ob-
jected to the ERM and “Otmar Emminger, the finance minister,
conceded it the right to opt out of its intervention obligation if
the Government was unable to secure an agreement with its
European partners on the need to realign”.
(2) Another option was to ask for a realignment.
(3) Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece had derogations.
(4) The decision to widen the ERM bands was complemented by a
bilateral agreement between the Dutch and German authorities
to preserve the former band.After August 1993 the ERM worked well,
maybe because the margin was wide, as low infla-
tion countries usually have exchange rate fluctua-
tions below 30 per cent. Most countries had their
currencies fluctuating within their earlier bands
for sometime, and later smoothly converging to
the European Monetary Union conversion rate(5).
3. THE PTE IN THE ERM
From August 1977 until September 1990 the
PTE exchange rate was managed in the context of
a crawling peg regime. Since the mid 1980s, the
rate of the crawling-peg of the PTE was succes-
sively cut down. In October 1990 the exchange rate
regime changed. The PTE floated around an un-
identified trend for an index that included only
the main currencies of the ERM, with particular
emphasis in some currencies. This change was
made with two objectives, of reducing the degree
of predictability surrounding the short-term value
of the PTE and of preparing the country for future
participation in the ERM. For this reason this re-
gime became known as the shadowing regime(6).
In April 1992, the PTE joined the ERM adopting a
fluctuation band of 6 per cent.
The Banco de Portugal was active in the foreign
exchange market either as a seller or as a buyer of
PTE. There were two types of interventions: “strict
sense” interventions (in the spot and in the for-
ward markets(7)) and the so-called “re-channeling
operations”. The “re-channeling operations” were
sales of foreign currency that had been bought
from the Treasury and had originated from Com-
munity transfers or the issuance of foreign cur-
rency denominated public debt. In this way, the
Banco de Portugal could manage the sale of signif-
icant amounts of foreign currency so as to avoid
major disturbances to the ongoing exchange rate
policy. An index for the interventions including
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Table 1
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN CENTRAL PARITIES FROM 1979 UNTIL 1998
FOR THE CURRENCIES PARTICIPATING IN THE ERM
DEM FRF NGL BEF PTE ESP IEP DKK ITL GBP
24 Sep. 79................ 2 — — -2.9 —
30 Nov. 79 ............... — — -4.8 —
23 Mar. 81 ............... — — - 6 —
05 Oct. 81................ 5 . 5 - 3 5 . 5 — — - 3 —
22 Feb. 82................ -8.5 — — -3 —
14 Jun. 82 ................ 4.25 -5.75 4.25 — — -2.75 —
21 Mar. 83 ............... 5 . 5 -2.5 3.5 1.5 — — -3.5 2.5 -2.5 —
22 Jul. 85................. 2222 — —22 - 6 —
07 Apr. 86 ............... 3 - 3 3 1 — — 1 —
04 Aug. 86 ............... — — - 8 —
12 Jan. 87 ................ 3 3 2 — — —
08 Jan. 90 ................ — -3.7 —
14 Sep. 92................ 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 -3.5 3.5
17 Sep. 92................ - 5 — —
23 Nov. 92 ............... - 6 - 6 — —
01 Feb. 93................ -10 — —
1 3M a y9 3 ................ -6.5 -8 — —
06 Mar. 95 ............... -3.5 -7 — —
16 Mar. 98 ............... 3—
Sources: Gros and Thygesen (1992) and Banco de Portugal Annual Report (various editions).
Note: “—” means out of the ERM.
(5) Exceptions were the ESP and the PTE; in March 1995 both re-
aligned.
(6) For an analysis of the period before ERM membership see
Banco de Portugal Annual Report (various editions).
(7) Forward interventions, which were minor and mostly concen-
trated in 1998, were converted into spot interventions accord-
ing to the formula described in the appendix.the “re-channelling operations”, was built, as well
as its cumulative. A negative value for the index
corresponds to a purchase of PTE, and a positive
value to a sale of PTE. The intervention index is
the ratio between the daily intervention and the
highest absolute value of the daily intervention in
the period of ERM membership times 100. In this
paper we concentrate our attention in the total in-
terventions index, which includes all types of in-
terventions. Chart 1A shows the cumulative for-
eign total interventions index.
Since the late 1980s until August 1992, the
Banco de Portugal intervened in the foreign ex-
change market mainly as a seller of PTE. As Chart
1A shows the cumulative foreign total interven-
tions index achieved its highest value in mid-
August. In Chart 1B we observe that the descend-
ing behaviour of the cumulative interventions in-
dex was not accompanied by an equivalent reduc-
tion of net foreign reserves, which showed a fairly
stable path from 1993 onwards. This reflects the
fact that interventions in this period were to a
large extent “re-channeling operations”.
The ERM crisis of 1992-93 affected the PTE. The
PTE was under continued pressure from 20 of Au-
gust 1992 till 23 of November 1992, and the cumu-
lative foreign interventions index went from 1583
in August to 987 in November. In September 1992,
when the central rate of the ESP was devalued by 5
per cent and the ITL and GBP left the ERM, the
PTE was under a speculative attack (see Chart 2).
The Banco de Portugal intervened buying a mas-
sive amount of PTE (the intervention index
achieved its lowest value on the 16th, the day be-
fore the ESP was devalued), the overnight interest
rate increased to 68 per cent (see Chart 3) and the
tomorrow/next interest rate on the euro-escudo
market was above 1000 per cent. This action had a
momentary effect on the exchange rate as a few
days after the PTE appreciated by about 4 per cent.
Although the PTE exchange rate was relatively
stable, the foreign reserves decreased at a fast pace
until the 23rd of November, when the central rate
of the PTE and of the ESP were devalued by 6 per
cent. On this day the tomorrow/next interest rate
exceeded 250 per cent and the Banco de Portugal















































































































































































































































































































































































































































PTE/DEM EXCHANGE RATE AND FOREIGN


















































ERM band upper limit





Apr.92 Apr.93 Apr.94 Apr.95 Apr.96 Apr.97 Apr.98sold a massive amount of foreign reserves, the for-
eign intervention index achieved its third lowest
value.
The following 3 months were calm; neither the
cumulative foreign interventions index nor the ex-
change rate changed much. But in mid-February
1993, the PTE currency was again under pressure;
the Banco de Portugal made sizable purchases of
PTE, until the 23rd of April 1993. Between those
two dates the cumulative foreign interventions in-
dex went from 1024 to 604. The overnight rate was
kept for about 3 months, at a very high level; dur-
ing March the weekly average overnight rate
climbed 11 percentage points, which had marked
effects on the longer maturity interest rates. On
13th of May 1993, the PTE realigned by 6.5 per
cent, while the ESP realigned by 8 per cent. The
day after the PTE depreciated 3 per cent. The PTE
had not been under particularly strong pressure
during the previous 3 weeks. From the 23rd of
April 1993 until the 13th of May 1993 there were no
peaks in the interventions, or in the overnight in-
terest rates, and the PTE exchange rate remained
broadly stable. Nevertheless, in the context of the
request by the Spanish authorities to devalue the
central rate of the peseta, it was decided by the
Portuguese Authorities to realign.
After the May realignment until the 30th of July
of 1993, interventions were negligible, and the
overnight interest rate was relatively low. During
the month of July 1993 most currencies of the ERM
were again under tension. The PTE exchange rate
depreciated considerably during this month, by
about 8 per cent. Just from the 19th of July to the 1st
of August of 1993 it depreciated by 6.3 per cent. In
the 2nd of August 1993 the ERM fluctuation bands
were enlarged and the PTE depreciated 2.3 per
cent in just one day(8). This change was temporary
as two days after the PTE appreciated 4.2 per cent.
Until July 1994, with the exception of two peri-
ods, from the second half of December 1993 until
the first week of March of 1994 and during April
of 1994 and the first 3 weeks of May of 1994, Banco
de Portugal kept buying PTE. The cumulative for-
eign interventions index was -37 on July 1994. The
interest rate had two peaks in April 1994 and June
1994, the more pronounced was on the 7th of April,
when the overnight interest rate achieved 36.5 per
cent and the PTE appreciated by 3 per cent.
From July 1994 until March 1995, when the PTE
experienced its third and last realignment, there
were no significant developments in the PTE ex-
change market. As in the previous realignment,
once again the PTE was not under strong pressure
until the realignment took place. This was even
clearer this time, as during this relatively large pe-
riod there were almost no changes in the interest
rate or in the interventions, and the PTE exchange
rate had a smooth behaviour with a depreciation
of 0.6 per cent. On the 6th of March 1995 the central
parity of the escudo was adjusted by 3.5 per cent
and the central rate of the ESP was devalued by 7
per cent. On that day and two days after, the
Banco de Portugal was in the market selling for-
eign currency and the intervention index achieved
quite low values, -31 and -43, respectively.
After March 1995 until the second week of Jan-
uary of 1997 interventions were of smaller size.
Since March 1995 the PTE appreciated signifi-
cantly and the Banco de Portugal decided to make
a large purchase of foreign currency to avoid a too
large appreciation of the currency. During the sec-
ond week of January the intervention index
achieved in 3 nonconsecutive days the values of
29, 65 and 39. Until the end of 1998 there would be
a few more sales of foreign currency by the Banco
de Portugal. The last intervention was in the third
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 2003 49
Articles
Chart 3
OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATE AND FOREIGN




































































































































































































































(8) The Banco de Portugal did not make much use of the larger
fluctuation band, as the PTE did not fluctuate outside the “out-
dated” narrower band.week of October 1998 and at that date the cumula-
tive foreign interventions index was -1564.
As we saw, the various episodes of exchange
rate pressure were addressed in different manners.
In some of these episodes the Banco de Portugal
decided to defend the currency strongly, in others
it decided, following other central banks, not to
defend the currency and instead realign, or widen
the band. The first period of tension (see Charts 4A
and 4B), around September 1992, was overcome
with heavy interventions and interest rate man-
agement, without resorting to realignment, as
Spain did while GBP and ITL floated. The next pe-
riod of tension (see Charts 4A and 4B), November
1992, was resolved with interventions and realign-
ment. In this second attack, the Portuguese Au-
thorities decided to follow the Spanish realign-
ment. As the currencies of some of our main trad-
ing partners depreciated substantially, the realign-
ment can be seen as a measure to curb competi-
tiveness losses. In the third period of pressure for
PTE (see Charts 5A and 5B), February-April of
1993, the attack was defended with interventions
and interest rates – actually kept high for a rela-
tively long period– with success as the exchange
rate was close to the central parity. The realign-
ment of May 1993 was not closely preceded by
pressure on the PTE. It appears as a response to
50 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 2003
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Chart 4A
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3the ESP realignment. The PTE July-August 1993
tension was partially resolved by the widening of
the band. In July the Portuguese Authorities de-
cided to follow the majority of the ERM members
by widening the PTE band. The period before the
last realignment of the PTE in March 1995 (see
Charts 6A and 6B), done together with the ESP
once more, was a peaceful period without active
policy.
4. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXCHANGE RATE
MANAGEMENT
In simple economic monetary models only un-
sterilized interventions, as they change the relative
supply of domestic and foreign money, have ef-
fects on the exchange rate. The monetary model
needs to be more complex for sterilized interven-
tion to have effects. Namely, the model should al-
low for a portfolio balance channel and/or a sig-
nalling channel. However, in the conduct of ex-
change rate policy, central banks also use sterilized
interventions, and most of the empirical literature
considers sterilized interventions.
The assessment of the effectiveness of exchange
rate policy instruments considered in the empiri-
cal literature is linked to their short run effects on
the exchange rate(9). There is no consensual defini-
tion of efficacy in the literature. Fatum (2000)
takes, essentially, two criteria, that of Frankel
(1994) and that of Humpage (1996). The former
considers that the central bank is effective if the
national currency appreciates when it sells foreign
currency. The latter defines a successful interven-
tion as one where the purchase of the national cur-
rency is associated with a smaller depreciation of
it relative to the situation before the intervention.
Dominguez (2002) also follows the criterion of
Frankel (1994). In Braga de Macedo et al (2002) and
in Brandner et al (2001) the sale of foreign currency
is effective if the national currency appreciates
or/and the volatility of the exchange rate de-
creases. Stix (2002) defines that an intervention is
successful if it is able to decrease the probability of
a high volatility state for the exchange rate. Kraay
(2003) identifies a failed speculative attack with an
event where sharp reserve losses and sharp in-
creases in the nominal interest rates are not fol-
lowed by a large devaluation.
The evidence on the effectiveness of the ex-
change rate policy instruments is mixed. Differ-
ences in results across studies about that effective-
ness depend, among other things, on the definition
of efficacy used. Fatum (2000) examines the
DEM/USD exchange rate and finds that in the
short run interventions affect the probability of
success, especially if coordinated and infrequent.
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Chart 6A
PTE/DEM EXCHANGE RATE AND FOREIGN















































































































ERM upper limit band
PTE/DEM












































OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATE AND FOREIGN




















































































































































(9) The majority of the studies consider only one of the policy in-
struments, either interventions or interest rates.Dominguez (2002) does a case study for the JPY,
USD and DEM and finds that interventions are
most of the times successful. Braga de Macedo et al
(2002) study the PTE currency, obtaining mixed re-
sults. They consider the time horizon from Sep-
tember 1989 until December 1998 and divide it
into three periods. Each period is divided into a
low and a high volatility subperiod. Interventions
are effective only in some of these subperiods.
Brandner et al (2001) study several ERM curren-
cies including the PTE and find no evidence of for-
eign exchange intervention effects either on the ex-
change rate, or on its volatility. Stix (2002) finds
that, for France and Spain, interventions seem to
have increased both the probability of realignment
and of a speculative attack. Kraay (2003) finds no
evidence that high interest rates help in defending
the currency for a large sample of developed and
developing countries. Finally, Neely (2001) con-
ducts a survey, where several monetary authori-
ties are asked about their intervention practices,
obtaining that foreign exchange intervention does
affect exchange rates(10). All the respondents be-
lieved interventions have effects on the exchange
rate. Most said the effects are over the short-run.
About 60 per cent of the respondents believed the
effects on the exchange rate take less than a day
and 28 per cent of the respondents that it they take
a few days.
There are relevant difficulties in interpreting
the results of the existing empirical work on the ef-
fectiveness of the policy instruments. The data an-
alyzed are “treated” data, as they are already the
result of market behaviour and intended policy ac-
tions, i.e., it is impossible to know how the ex-
change rate would have behaved if the central
bank had not intervened in the market. If the ob-
jective of the central bank is to smooth the ex-
change rate time path, the coefficients of the inter-
vention levels or of the interest rate variations on a
regression of the exchange rate variation will be
biased towards zero. In this type of analysis there
is an endogeneity problem, as the interventions,
the interest rate and the exchange rate are deter-
mined jointly. Therefore, the analysis of the cur-
rency market would require a specification of a
more structural model to disentangle the effects of
policy from the effects from variations in the net
demand of private agents. But this alternative, a
multi-equation structural empirical model, is diffi-
cult to formalize. Before that can be achieved fur-
ther progress is necessary in understanding the
determinants of the supply and of the demand for
currency, especially during periods of high volatil-
ity in the exchange rate.
The difficulties just referred in reaching a rea-
sonable definition of effectiveness should be seen
as cautionary for the analysis undertaken in this
section. It will be assumed that the objective of the
central bank is for its currency to have a smooth
exchange rate behaviour, and namely to defend it
from large fluctuations. A successful exchange rate
policy is defined as one for which that objective is
accomplished. We define the central bank as being
active when either interventions in defence of the
PTE are large (that is, large purchases of PTE), or
the overnight interest rate increases substantially.
The central bank can be successful being either ac-
tive or passive.
The specific taxonomy of our analysis is the fol-
lowing. We consider the time frame between 6
April 1992 (the PTE ERM entry date) and 31 De-
cember 1998 (just before the adoption of the euro).
Each trading day t in this period is considered as
an event. We select episodes where there were
jointly or not: (E1) a cumulative depreciation of
the PTE against the DEM from the beginning of
day t to the end of day t+k, larger than the mean
plus x standard deviations; (E2) a cumulative in-
crease in the PTE overnight interest rate from the
beginning of day t to the end of day t+k, larger
than the mean plus y standard deviations; and (E3)
cumulative foreign exchange interventions that are
purchases of PTE, from the beginning of day t to
the end of day t+k, larger than the mean plus z
standard deviations(11). The number of events is
equal to the number of trading days in our time
frame (i.e., 1686) minus k.
We did not use the interest rate series in levels
because it is not stationary over the sample period.
The criterion we used takes into account the
change in the interest rate, which is stationary.
This approach has a caveat as it implies that many
sequential days with high overnight interest rate
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(10) This set of countries includes all G7 countries, except for the
UK.
(11)The three time series, rate of depreciation, change in the over-
night interest rate and interventions, are stationary.are considered as events during which the central
bank was not active with that instrument.
Given this taxonomy, we consider a situation
where either (E2), (E3), or both, were verified as an
event in which the central bank was active. Other-
wise the central bank was passive. A successful e-
vent is one for which (E1) is not verified(12).A s
usually conditional probabilities can be defined.
We compute the distribution of success given the
central bank’s stance. Table 2 presents the condi-
tional and the unconditional probabilities for k =1
and for x=y=zand x = 2.5, 3, 3.5. Our results are
robust to changes in the definitions of the epi-
sodes, i.e. the conclusions were not altered in a
meaningful way when we considered cases where
xyz ≠≠ or k ≠ 1. The assumption taken for k is in
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(12) Our definition is closely related with that of Kraay (2003) for a
failed speculative attack for the speculator.line with the results reported in Neely (2001),
about 90 per cent of the responses were that the
full effect of the interventions was felt within a
few days.
As Table 2 shows, the share of days in which
the Banco de Portugal was active ranges from 2.1
per cent to 4.4 per cent (as expected the number of
active days increases as the selected bands shrink).
The success of the central bank when it was active
was large, varying from 90.5 per cent to 91.4 per
cent of the events, (the number of successes de-
clines as the allowed fluctuation band for the ex-
change rate diminishes). The intervention alone
was used about 80 per cent of the time, constitut-
ing the main instrument used, being successful
more than 70 per cent of time (see Chart 7). The in-
strument interest rate alone or combined with in-
terventions was less frequently used; less than 20
per cent of the times the central bank was active.
This result should be seen in the context of the
caveat mentioned before. The period during which
this limitation was more severe was the one be-
tween 17 March 1993 and 16 May 1993. In this pe-
riod the interest rate was always above 16.4 per
cent, and nevertheless according to our indicator
the instrument interest rate was used only once
when y =2.5.
Most of the time, between 95.6 per cent and
97.9 per cent, the Banco de Portugal did not
change significantly its policy instruments. This
decision of not acting in the markets proved to be
successful, as more than 98 per cent of the time the
PTE exchange rate did not depreciate substan-
tially. The small fraction of days (less than 2 per
cent) in which the Banco de Portugal was passive
but, nevertheless, the exchange rate depreciated
substantially, can be largely explained by the use
of other instruments. About 2/3 of these events
correspond to days close to the three realignments
of the PTE and to days in July 1993 until the wid-
ening of the ERM bands. This behaviour on the
part of the Banco de Portugal was deliberate. It
was recognized that the best strategy was to let the
PTE follow the behaviour of the other ERM cur-
rencies under attack. The realignments followed
the ESP depreciations, and in July 1993 there was a
generalized attack against almost all of the ERM
currencies that culminated in the widening of the
bands.
When active the Banco de Portugal was not suc-
cessful 8.6 per cent, 9.1 per cent and 9.5 per cent of
the times, which corresponds to just a few events:
3, 5 and 7.
The main conclusion is that the Banco de Portu-
gal exchange rate management, during the ERM
period, was successful either when it was active in
the market, or when it was not active in the mar-
ket, as the PTE exchange rate had almost always a
smooth behaviour, that is without strong deprecia-
tion episodes.
5. FINAL REMARKS
This paper studies whether the Portuguese ex-
change rate management was successful during
the period of ERM membership. Existing empirical
studies have focused mostly on assessing the effec-
tiveness of a single exchange rate policy instru-
ment — typically interventions — and have used
various kinds of criteria. In this paper, we take into
account the possibility of the central bank combin-
ing both interventions and interest rate for manag-
ing the exchange rate. The criterion used for as-
sessing the effectiveness of the exchange rate man-
agement was the absence of large depreciations
and an event with central bank action was defined
by either massive purchases of PTE by the Banco
de Portugal, or large increases of the overnight in-
terest rate.
The results indicate that the Banco de Portugal
used massive purchases of PTE or large increases
in the interest rates seldom, during the period of
the ERM membership, and mostly with success.
The most frequent policy choice was interventions
alone, and that was also the most successful policy.
This result should be seen in the context of the
analysis, which considers the change in the inter-
est rate instead of its level. During the period be-
tween 17 March 1993 and 16 May 1993 this limita-
tion is particularly strong.
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MECHANICS OF A SPECULATIVE ATTACK
This section provides a brief exposition on the
behaviour of speculators and currency markets,
with special reference to the choices of the central
bank on defending an attack. Suppose the cur-
rency under attack was the PTE and that the PTE
exchange rate in period t is St, i.e. each PTE was
worthSt DEM. Speculators could attack the PTE in
the spot market or in the forward market. The
strategy of using the spot market is the following.
The speculator borrows amount Y of PTE at the lo-
cal interest rate R*t, converts the PTE in DEM at
the spot exchange rate, St, and deposits the DEM
at the German money markets at the interest rate
Rt. At the end of the period the DEM are converted
in PTE. The profit in DEM of such action is: Y[St(1+
Rt)-St+1(1+R *t)]. The profit is positive if St(1+ Rt)>
St+1(1+R *t). When R*t>Rt the speculator only gains
if the PTE depreciates.
If Ft+1 > St+1, where Ft+1 is the forward exchange
rate, then the speculator by selling forward
amount X of PTE has a profit in DEM of X[Ft+1 -
St+1]. Since the arbitrage condition St(1+ Rt)=Ft+1(1+
R*t), always holds, speculators make profits in the
forward market if and only if profits can be made
in the spot market.
If X=(1+R *t)Y, the attack in the spot market is
equivalent to the attack in the forward market in
terms of the PTE that are sold for DEM in the spot
market. The bank that buys the PTE forward from
the speculators hedges its currency risk. In the
spot market trades amount X/(1+R *t) of PTE for
DEM and deposits amount St X/(1+R *t) of DEM in
the German money market. The return on the de-
posit is (1+ Rt)St X/(1+R *t). Thus, the amount the
bank is willing to pay for the X PTE sold forward,
Ft+1X= (1+ Rt)St X/(1+R *t). Whether the attack is in
the spot market or in the forward market the re-
sult is the same, Y PTE are sold in the spot market.
What can a central bank do to defend its cur-
rency? It can use moral suasion, selective capital
controls and regulation to prevent domestic banks
from lending domestic currency to speculators, in-
terventions (sale of foreign reserves) or raise the
domestic overnight money market interest rate.
Generally, in developed financial markets, instru-
ments like moral suasion do not have important
effects and the use of instruments like legislation
on capital controls is avoided.
By far, the most commonly used instruments to
defend a currency are interventions in the foreign
exchange market and the overnight interest rate.
The mechanics at work are simple. Speculators sell
the domestic currency in the spot market expect-
ing to put downward pressure on the exchange
rate and the central bank counters that expectation
by buying the domestic currency, through inter-
ventions. The central bank increases the overnight
interest rate to make unprofitable for the specula-
tors the action of borrowing domestic currency to
sell in the spot market.
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